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The Cost of Capital for the
Regulated Firm:
Background Issues
Neil Quigley
Industry Specific Regulation
• Industry specific regulation uses estimates of
cost to set prices / revenues
– Cost includes the competitive return on investment
(cost of capital).
• Quite different from standard Commerce Act
determinations of the past
– Public benefits (counterfactual)
– Use of market power
Commerce Commission Consideration
of the Cost of Capital
• Airports
• Electricity Lines
• Fonterra
• TSO business of Telecom
(supply of local access services to commercially non-viable
customers)
Time for an assessment of the trends
Significance
• If the WACC is too high the network operator
is over-compensated and investment is
encouraged.
• If the WACC is too low, the network operator
is under-compensated and investment will be
discouraged.
• Very large dynamic efficiency costs of a
WACC that is too low.
Regulated Industries
• Associated with substantial fixed and
irreversible investment
• Implications:
– The location as well as the quantum of
investment, matters
– Options created and destroyed by
regulation or investment have substantial
value
Regulated Industries
• Regulation sets a maximum return not a
guaranteed return
• Regulated firm is exposed to
competition, technical change and
movements in customers that will affect
return:
– The risk of asset stranding is material
The Commission’s Approach
The weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) as measured by a post-tax
form of the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM)
=
The appropriate measure of the rate of
return required by investors in regulated
firms
The Commission’s Approach
Key drivers of the WACC are:
• Risk-free rate
• Market Risk Premium
• Beta – a measure of the sensitivity of
asset returns to market returns
The Commission’s Approach
• Only systematic risk matters
“…the TSO cost of capital is only
concerned with compensation for non-
firm specific risk, and therefore firm-
specific risks …need not be
compensated..”
– An assumption of the model and a
statement of fact?
The Commission’s Approach
• Firms with similar elasticities of demand and
regulatory review periods, but in different
industries, will have comparable asset betas.
Unregulated firms in the same industry are
not comparable: they share industry-specific
rather than systematic risk, and systematic
risk does not affect beta.
The Commission’s Approach
Incentive regulation affects only firm-specific
risk so does not affect the required return.
RoR for Rate of Return Regulation
=
RoR for Price Cap (incentive) Regulation
The Commission’s Approach
• Firm-specific risk should be captured in
the cash flows rather than reflected in
the required rate of return.
– What does this mean?
The Commission’s Approach
• Possible interpretations:
– Investors do not require compensation for firm
specific risk
– The risk is symmetrical around the expectation
and therefore offsetting
– The expected cash flows are adjusted to
compensate for both the expectation and the
uncertainty around that expectation
– Full ex post compensation for firm specific risk is
to be provided through adjustment of the cash
flows
The Commission’s Approach
If regulation:
Reduces systematic risk (eg insulating
cash flows from market shocks),
But
Increases firm-specific risk (eg. greater
exposure to competition)
The required rate of return falls.
  
 
 
Type WACC
Electricity Lines 6.9%
Airports - Auckland 8.4%
Airports – Wellington 9.3%
Airports – Christchurch 8.9%
TSO 6.0%
Why Do Airports Have A Higher
WACC?
• Higher income elasticity of demand
• No fixed price element in charges
• Competition and technical change may
provide greater risk of stranding in
electricity lines and telecommunications,
but (in the CAPM) this does not affect
the required return
The Commission’s Approach
• The risk-free rate should be the rate of
return on government bonds
– at the beginning of the regulatory period
and
– having the same duration as the regulatory
period.
The Acid Test
• Is the Commission’s approach
appropriate for the task of calculating
the rate of return required by investors
in regulated firms?
The Cost of Capital for the
Regulated Firm:
Summary and Conclusion
Neil Quigley
CAPM
• Assumptions are unrealistic
– This is not unusual in theoretical models
– CAPM has no role for the issues that have been
the focus of microeconomics for 30 years (eg
information asymmetries)
• Inconsistent with practitioner evidence
• Widespread skepticism about rate of return
estimates based on the CAPM
Assumptions and Conclusions
• The exclusion of firm specific risk rests on the
perfect market assumptions of the CAPM.
• The claim that specific risk does not affect the
required rate of return is an assumption of the
CAPM, not an empirical fact.
• Rejecting compensation for specific risk
because it does not affect the required rate of
return in the CAPM effectively offers
assumptions as conclusions.
No Easy Solution
• Hard to “prove” alternative views
• Can’t value every option
• No simple model of how to make
adjustments for the limitations of CAPM.
• Declining to acknowledge the limits of
the CAPM is not an adequate response.
Term of the Risk Free Rate
• Substantial implications for the WACC
• Clear in respect of rate of return regulation,
but has no role for specific risk associated
with incentive regulation
• A major challenge for those who use the
long-term rate
– If long rates just provide some adjustment for firm-
specific risk, it is time to develop a better and more
explicit methodology.
Asset Beta
• In a rate of return framework and  CAPM
world, shocks that are fully compensated by
the regulator will not affect Beta
• Firm specific risk in a regulatory framework
where compensation is not provided is still to
be addressed
– This issue assumes greater importance under
incentive regulation than it did with rate of return
regulation
Asset Stranding
• A specific example of violation of the
assumptions of the CAPM
– Irreversible investment given uncertain
demand
Asset Stranding
• Rate of return regulation imposes risk
on customers, whereas incentive
regulation imposes risk on the firm’s
shareholders.
– Other things equal, the CAPM says that
investors will require the same rate of
return under both regimes.
Regulated Industries
• High levels of firm specific risk
associated with irreversible investment
– Often exacerbated by the effects of
regulation
• Greater divergence between the CAPM
and the market’s required return than in
other industries
Overall
• The Commission has provided a rigorous application
of the CAPM, and has advanced our understanding
of its application to regulated industries.
• The assumptions of the CAPM are unrealistic, and
strong enough to drive perverse conclusions about
the rate of return where market risk is small and
specific risk is large.
Overall
• The limitations of CAPM are most apparent
under incentive regulation
– Systematic risk is relatively low and specific risk is
relatively high
• The CAPM provides a starting point for
thinking about the required return for the
regulated firm, not the end point.
